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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the nature of community management of woodlots
and investigates the determinants of collective action and its effectiveness in managing
woodlots, based on a survey of 100 villages in Tigray, northern Ethiopia. Despite limited
current benefits received by community members, the woodlots contribute substantially
to community wealth, increasing members’ willingness to provide collective effort to
manage the woodlots. We find that benefits are greater and problems less on woodlots
managed at the village level than those managed at a higher municipality level, and that
the average intensity of management is greater on village-managed woodlots. The
factors that do significantly affect collective action include population density (higher
collective labor input and lower planting density at intermediate than at low or high
density), market access (less labor input, planting density and tree survival where
market access is better), and presence of external organizations promoting the woodlot
(reduces local effort to protect the woodlot and tree survival). The finding of an inverse
U-shaped relationship between population density and collective labor input is consis-
tent with induced innovation theory, with the increased labor/land ratio promoting
collective effort to invest in resources as population density grows to a moderate level,
while incentive problems may undermine collective action at high levels of population
density. These findings suggest collective action may be more beneficial and more effec-
tive when managed at a more local level, when the role of external organizations is more
demand-driven, and when promoted in intermediate population density communities
more remote from markets. In higher population density settings and areas closer to
markets, private-oriented approaches are likely to be more effective.
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1. Introduction
Common property resources1 are important sources of timber, fuelwood,
and grazing land in developing countries. Under unrestricted access by
community members, or ineffective use regulations, these resources are
exploited on a first-come, first-served basis. Each individual user of the
resource will tend to continue to utilize the resource until her average
revenue is equal to the marginal cost of utilizing the resource (Gordon,
1954). This results in overexploitation of the resource and the scarcity rent
of the resource becomes dissipated.
The solution to the problem of resource degradation in developing
countries depends not only on appropriate technologies and efficient
market prices, but also on local-level institutions of resource management
and the organizations to enforce them (Baland and Platteau, 1996;
Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995). Community resource management
institutions and organizations are now receiving greater attention as a
viable alternative to regulation by the state or privatization as a means of
rectifying inefficiencies caused by attenuated property right systems,
externalities, and other market failures.
However, devolving rights to local communities to help build institu-
tions for common property management may not be a sufficient condition
for sustainable use of such resources. Effectiveness in internal governance
is needed for the effective application of community rules (Swallow and
Bromley, 1995; Turner, Pearce, and Bateman, 1994). Hence, the need to
identify factors that facilitate or hinder the development and effectiveness
of local organizations becomes important.
In Ethiopia, rural communities depend primarily on common property
resources for irrigation water, construction material, fuelwood, and
grazing land. Population pressure, market and government failures, and
the absence or ineffectiveness of use regulations of common property
resources has resulted in severe degradation of the resources. Perhaps as a
result, Ethiopia has been identified as the country with the most environ-
mental problems in the Sahel belt (Hurni, 1985).
Resource degradation is particularly severe in the northern region of
Tigray. Soil erosion, soil nutrient depletion, moisture stress, deforestation,
and overgrazing are major environmental problems in the region (Fitsum
Hagos, Pender, and Gebresselassie, 1999). Currently forests and woodlots
cover less than 2 per cent of the regional area (BoANRD, 1995). The region
depends almost entirely on imported construction material. Severe
shortage of fuelwood has rendered rural communities increasingly depen-
dent on animal dung for fuel, contributing to the problem of declining soil
fertility (Fitsum Hagos, Pender, and Gebresselassie, 1999; Gebremedhin,
1998). Despite the fact that about 40 per cent of the total land area is used
for grazing (BoANRD, 1995), shortage of feed sources is the major live-
stock production problem.
The Tigray region is known not only for severe resource degradation, but
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1 Common property resources are defined as those resources that are owned and
managed by a given community. They are contrasted with open access resources
which have no defined owner.
also for concerted efforts to redress the problem, especially since 1991. Major
strategies of environmental rehabilitation include construction of stone ter-
races, soil bunds, and micro dams; establishment of area enclosures (areas
enclosed from human and animal interference to promote natural regener-
ation) and community woodlots (enclosures with enrichment plantation of
trees or areas of new plantation); and enforcement of grazing restrictions
(Gebremedhin, 1998). Since 1991, the role of local communities in resource
management has been increasing, particularly in the management of area
enclosures, woodlots, and grazing lands. However, little evidence exists
regarding the nature of local-level institutions and organization for resource
management in Tigray, or their effectiveness. More generally, despite the
extensive literature on common property resource management (Ostrom,
1990; Bromley, 1992), further empirical research is required to identify
factors associated with collective action and its effectiveness in developing
countries, since the effectiveness of collective resource management strat-
egies are likely to be context specific (Runge, 1992).
This paper seeks to add to the growing literature on common property
resources in developing countries. The paper has two inter-related objec-
tives. First, it evaluates the nature and impact of community management
in the regeneration of woodlots in Tigray, considering the benefits to com-
munities from these areas and problems encountered. Second, it
investigates using econometric methods the determinants of collective
action and its effectiveness in managing community woodlots.
2. The setting
The study area, Tigray, is found in northern Ethiopia on the Sudano-
Sahelian drylands zone (Warren and Khogali, 1992). It covers an
approximate area of 80,000 sq. km, with a population of more than 3.3
million and annual population growth rate of 3 per cent. The topography
of the region is characterized as a mountainous plateau and the climate 
as tropical semi-arid (Virgo and Munro, 1978). Annual rainfall ranges 
from 450 to 980 mm with significant spatial and temporal variability
(Gebremedhin, 1998). Most of the precipitation falls within the three
months of June, July, and August, and with high intensity.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of Tigray. More than 85 per
cent of the regional population depends on rainfed mixed crop–livestock
subsistence agriculture, with oxen power supplying the only draft power
for plowing. Except for some areas in the Western and Southern zones of
the region which produce surplus during good rainfall years, the rest
either produce just enough for subsistence during good rainfall years or
face chronic food deficit. The causes of the structural food deficit include
severe environmental degradation, low soil fertility, inadequate and
erratic rainfall, vulnerability to pests, lack of appropriate technology, small
size and fragmentation of land holding, lack of diversification in economic
activities, lack of oxen for draft power, and little use of modern inputs.
About 40 per cent of the total area of the region is used for grazing
(BoANRD, 1995). Most of the crop residue is used as feed, fuel, or con-
struction material. Several areas of the highland plateau of Tigray are 
said to have been covered with forests at the turn of the century 
Environment and Development Economics 131
(Wolde-Giorgis, 1993). Currently forests and woodlots cover only about
1.6 per cent of the Area of Tigray (BoANRD, 1995). Cutting trees for fuel,
timber, and agricultural implements, and clearing forests to expand agri-
cultural land have exhausted the forest cover of the area. Forests, woodlots
and grazing lands have been predominantly common property resources
or open access resources in the region.
Since 1991, the Ethiopian government has embarked on an economic
development strategy known as Agricultural Development-Led
Industrialisation (ADLI), which places greater emphasis on agricultural
development. Within the framework of the ADLI, regional administrations
have been able to draw economic strategies specific to their conditions.
Conservation-based ADLI became the primary goal of economic develop-
ment in Tigray, which focuses on conservation of natural resources and
popular participation. The natural resource conservation and development
effort in the region has been aimed at improving the management of soil
and water resources, environmental rehabilitation, and protection through
area enclosures and development of community woodlots, the develop-
ment of irrigation through the construction of micro dams and river
diversions, and reforestation. Other elements in the regional ADLI include
improving productivity in agriculture through improved agricultural
practices and inputs, promoting off-farm employment through diversifica-
tion of the rural economy, and development of rural infrastructure.
The experience with area enclosures and community woodlots in
Ethiopia during the previous military government was disappointing.
Within five years after the 1985 famine, more than 80,000 ha of hillsides were
closed to most forms of use to foster the regeneration of indigenous plant
species. By 1995, most of these enclosures and community woodlots were
harvested or destroyed (Hoben, 1995). The factors responsible for the poor
performance of the environmental reclamation program include inade-
quate scientific and technical knowledge, a standardized approach without
regard to local agro-ecological conditions, and disregard of the views and
interests of the rural population whom the program was intended to serve.
Program implementation was top-down, authoritarian, and politicized.
Prior to 1991, the experience with area enclosures and community
woodlots in Tigray was limited. Since 1991, area enclosures and com-
munity woodlots in the region have been developed through a more
participatory process. A development agent of the Bureau of Agriculture
and Natural Resource Development (BoANRD), in collaboration with the
local tabia baito (local administration council), identify an area to be closed
and/or planted. The final decision is then made at a general meeting of the
community members.
Site preparation for community plantation including construction of
microbasins, terraces, and digging holes usually begins in late April of
each year. Between 1992 and 1996, about 49 million seedlings are reported
to have been planted in community woodlots (BoANRD, 1996). The
average survival rate is reported to have been around 40 per cent, but can
be as low as 10 per cent in the lowland areas.
Guards who protect area enclosures or community woodlots are nomi-
nated from the local people and the community is expected to contribute
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for the payment of the guards. In areas where community contributions for
guard payment are not forthcoming, site guards are either allowed to cut
grass from the enclosure for private use or graze animals. In some cases,
government or non-government organizations pay for the guard based on
food-for-work programs.
The area enclosures and community woodlots were established pri-
marily for ecological regeneration rather than economic benefits.
However, people’s expectations about economic benefits from these areas
are increasing, which will present a major management challenge in terms
of technical inputs and institutional arrangements for utilization and dis-
tribution of benefits.
The development of community woodlots requires tree seedlings. Three
types of tree nurseries operate in Tigray: state, community, and private
(BoANRD, 1996). Until 1996, about 210 state nurseries with an average
land area of half a hectare and a potential to produce more than 390,000
seedlings per year at full capacity had been operating in the region. State
nurseries now sell seedlings to farmers. Community nurseries were
launched in order to decentralize seedling distribution and reduce prob-
lems in seedling transportation. By 1996, about 446 community nurseries
were operational with an average area of 0.04 ha and capacity of 60,000 to
80,000 seedlings per year. Community nurseries receive material and tech-
nical support from the BoANRD while the local community contributes
labour and management. In addition to state and community nurseries,
individual farmers raise their own seedlings, although on a limited scale.
Low survival rates and poor tree establishment in community woodlots
appear to have encouraged a different tree planting arrangement in the
region. Distribution of degraded communal lands, mostly gullies, for
private tree plantation is now being practiced in the region. The initiative
began in a village known as Echmare in Gulomekeda woreda (district) of the
Eastern zone of Tigray in 1992 (BoANRD, 1996). The community, upon
observation of the benefits of private tree plantation, took the initiative to
divide communal land, in parcels of 3m. by 6m., to individuals for tree plan-
tation without requiring government approval. This initiative later was
accepted by officials at the regional level and distribution of communal land
for private tree plantation is now occurring in several woredas of the region.
There appears to be ambiguity in tree tenure rights in Tigray. Although
a farmer has the ownership right to trees grown on his homestead and cul-
tivated lands, he or she needs to get permission from the local baito to cut
the trees. Regional laws also prohibit planting eucalyptus and cactus trees
on cultivated land. The regional effort to plant trees has not been accom-
panied by proper incentives to encourage tree plantation by households or
the community at large.
3. Theoretical framework
Let M represent collective management.2 We assume there is decreasing
marginal benefit and increasing marginal cost of collective management
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2 Indicators of collective action can be continuous or binary. In this theoretical
framework, we treat collective action as continuous variable for mathematical
simplicity.
(including the cost of monitoring and enforcing collective action). The
benefit and cost functions3 can thus be specified as
B(M)  aM  bM2
C(M)  cM  dM2
where a, b, c, and d are positive constants. The optimal level of collective
action is affected by a vector of exogenous factors, X, since the exogenous
factors affect total benefits and costs of collective action. These exogenous
factors include population density (PD), agricultural potential (AP),
market access (MA), involvement of external organizations (EP), village
level management (versus municipality level) (LM), and size of the
resource (SIZE). These exogenous factors are assumed to shift the marginal
benefit and cost curves but do not affect the slope of the curves.4,5
Incorporating the effect of the exogenous factors into the cost and benefit
functions, we have
B(M, X)  (X  B)M  bM
2 (1)
C(M, X)  (X  C)M  dM
2 (2)
Where  and  are coefficients to be estimated and B and C are stochastic
disturbance terms. Using the definitions of the exogenous factors, equa-
tions (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
B(M, X)  [0 1PD  2PD
2  3AP  4MA 
5EP  6LM  7SIZE  B]M  bM
2 (3)
C(M, X)  [0 1PD  2PD
2  3AP  4MA  5EP 
6LM  7SIZE  C]M  dM
2 (4)
We hypothesize that 1  0, 3  0, 4  0, 6  0, 7  0 and the signs of
2, 5 are indeterminate, and that 1  0, 2  0, 3 	 0, 4 	 0, 5  0, 6
 0, 7  0.
Higher population density leads to greater scarcity of wood, hence
greater marginal benefit of collective management of woodlots (1  0)
Higher agricultural potential increases the marginal benefit to managing
woodlots as does better market access (3, 4  0). External programs may
increase the benefit of collective management by increasing awareness of
profitable opportunities or of new technologies (5  0), but they may
undermine benefits if the programs prevent communities from harvesting
at the optimal time or otherwise undercutting local institutions (5  0).
Local-level management may increase benefits (6  0), since local
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3 We chose the quadratic function to represent the assumptions of decreasing mar-
ginal benefit and cost functions since this functional form represents the
assumptions without imposing restrictions on the parameters.
4 These factors may also shift the intercepts of the total benefit and cost curves,
though this has no effect on the marginal benefits or costs, and hence no effect on
optimal management.
5 Allowing collective action to affect the slopes of the marginal cost and benefit
curves may alter the expected effects of some of the exogenous factors.
decision makers are likely more aware of local conditions affecting ben-
efits. Greater size of the resource increases the benefit of collective
management (7  0). Economies of scale are assumed to reduce costs of
monitoring and enforcing collective action as population density increases
from a low level (1  0), but at high population density, diseconomies of
organizing and enforcing agreements are assumed to dominate (2  0).
Higher agricultural potential or better market access may lead to higher
labor opportunities and wages, hence higher costs of collective action (3
 0, 4  0), unless labor markets are so well integrated that local wages
are not affected by local opportunities (3  0, 4  0). External programs
are likely to help reduce the cost of organizing and enforcing collective
action (5  0). Collective management organized at a more local level is
likely to be easier (less costly) to enforce (6  0). Costs of managing a
resource are likely to increase with the size of the resource, though poss-
ibly at a diminishing rate as a result of economies of scale in management
(7  0).
Using equations (1) and (2), the marginal benefit and cost functions are 
 X  2bM (5)
 X  2dM (6)
The necessary condition for maximum is that the marginal benefit equals
the marginal cost. Hence, combining equations (5) and (6) and rearranging
terms we have
M*  (7)
and
 (8)
Hence, we have the following comparative static results
 0 at low PD, since 1  1 0 and 
will be larger than 2(2  2)PD
for low enough PD
 0 at high PD if 2  2  0 (e.g.,
if 2 
 0)
 0 at all PD if 2  2  0
if agricultural potential does not increase the 
opportunity cost of labor or provide more exit
options, thus increasing the cost of enforcing 
collective action (i.e., 3  0).
if market access does not raise opportunity 
cost of labor or provide more exit options 
(4  0).
i  i
2(b  d)
M*

Xi
X  X

2(b  d)
C

M
B

M
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
1  1  2(2  2)PD

2(b  d)
M*

PD
  0
3  3
2(b  d)
M*

AP
  0
4  4
2(b  d)
M*

MA
if external organizations do not undermine 
benefits (5  0).
if economies of scale reduce cost of 
management relative to benefits (7  7).
4. Research methods and hypotheses
Methods
This study is based on a survey of 50 tabias (the lowest administrative unit
in Tigray, comprising usually four or five villages) in the highlands6 of
Tigray in the 1998–1999 cropping season. Sample tabias were selected
based on random sampling stratified by proximity to a market town and
presence of an irrigation project. Within each tabia, two villages were
selected randomly. A semi-structured questionnaire was administered
with representative individuals at both levels. Each interview involved ten
respondents chosen to represent different age groups (below 30 years of
age, and older), villages (representation of each sample village), primary
occupations (farming or off-farm), and gender. The survey collected infor-
mation about changes in agricultural and natural resource conditions
between 1991 and 1998, and their causes and effects.
Analysis of descriptive information from the survey was used to identify
the nature of management of woodlots, the roles of different organizations
(local and external) in managing them, and the benefits and problems
encountered. Econometric analysis was used to investigate the determi-
nants of collective action and its effectiveness in managing woodlots. The
indicators of collective action and effectiveness used in the econometric
analysis include the amount of uncompensated collective labor per hectare
invested in managing the woodlot, whether the community pays for a guard
to protect the woodlot, whether there were any violations of the restrictions
on use of the woodlot, the number of trees planted per hectare on the
woodlot since its establishment, and the survival rate of the trees planted.
The type of regression model used depends on the nature of the depen-
dent variable. We use a tobit model to explain collective labor investment
and survival rate, since these variables are left-censored at zero. We use
binary probit models to explain whether the community pays for the
guard or whether there were violations of restrictions, since these are
binary variables. We use least squares regressions for tree planting
density, since this variable is not censored. In all regressions, coefficients
and standard errors were corrected for the sampling weights and stratifi-
cation, and the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
non-independence of multiple observations from the same primary sam-
pling unit (tabia).
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6 Highlands are defined as those areas above 1500 m a s l.
  0
5  5
2(b  d)
M*

EP
  0
6  6
2(b  d)
M*

LM
  0
7  7
2(b  d)
M*

SIZE
Hypotheses
The factors used to explain variations in collective action and its effective-
ness included population density, access to market, agricultural potential,
the presence of external organizations, whether the woodlot is managed at
the village or tabia level, and the area of the woodlot. Our hypotheses
about how these factors may influence collective action draw from the
literature on induced institutional innovation and collective action in man-
aging common property resources (Boserup, 1965; Olson, 1965; Hayami
and Ruttan, 1985; North, 1990; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland
and Platteau, 1996; Pender and Scherr, 1999; Pender, 1999; Otsuka and
Place, 1999). At low levels of population density, the demand for collective
action to manage resources will be low, and the organizational costs of
attaining it high. As population density grows, increasing land scarcity
will increase the benefits of improved resource management, whether
through collective action or development of private property. This may
induce increased collective action, particularly if economies of scale or
high exclusion costs favor collective over private management. However,
as population density grows to very high levels, the gains from collective
action may be outweighed by the incentive problems associated with it, as
rising scarcity increases the benefits from attempting to ‘free-ride’ on the
efforts of others. The economies of scale of collective action may diminish,
or be replaced by diseconomies of scale at higher population density. As a
result, the net benefits of collective action may stabilize or even decline
while the net benefits of privatization continue to increase with increasing
population density. Thus there may be an ‘inverse U relation’ between col-
lective action and population density, with higher levels and effectiveness
of collective action at intermediate population density than at very low or
very high density (Pender, 1999).
Access to markets may also have mixed effects on collective action. On
the one hand, having better access to markets increases the value of
resources and thus the value of managing resources well, which may favor
collective action. On the other hand, better market access may tend to
undermine individuals’ incentives to cooperate by increasing the oppor-
tunity cost of labor or by offering more ‘exit’ options, making it more
difficult to punish those who fail to cooperate (Baland and Platteau, 1996;
Pender and Scherr, 1999). Thus, the impact of market access on collective
action can only be determined empirically. Agricultural potential may
have mixed impacts on collective action for similar reasons.
The presence of external organizations may favor collective action when
those organizations are seeking to provide complementary inputs to local
collective inputs, but may undermine collective action if external organiz-
ations are providing substitutes for collective action, or otherwise
undermining collective action (such as by increasing the ‘exit options’ of
local community members, as noted above) (Pender and Scherr, 1999).
We expect that collective action is easier to obtain and likely to be more
effective when cooperation of a smaller number of people is needed, when
the beneficiaries are a more homogenous and stable group, and when the
benefits received by those people are more apparent (Olson, 1965;
Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Thus, we
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expect that collective action will be more prevalent and more effective for
village-managed woodlots than for tabia-managed woodlots, since villages
are smaller, more cohesive and a more stable unit than tabias (e.g., the tabias
were reorganized in 1995 to include more villages) and since, as noted
below, the benefits accruing to community members from village-managed
woodlots have been greater than the benefits from tabia-managed woodlots.
To the extent that economies of scale are important in favoring collective
action (for example, in protecting the woodlot), we expect that collective
action should be greater and more effective on larger woodlots.
5. Results
Descriptive analysis
Almost nine out of ten tabias in the highlands of Tigray have woodlots
(table 1). There are nine woodlots per tabia on average, and these average
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Table 1. Characteristics of community woodlots
Means (standard errors in parentheses)a
Item Village- Tabia- All woodlots
managed managed
Percentage of tabias with a woodlot 57.7 29.9 87.6
(8.1) (7.2) (5.8)
Number of woodlots per tabia 7.2 0.9 9.0
(1.3) (0.2) (1.3)
Area of woodlots (ha) 5.1 18.5 7.9
(0.9) (3.8) (1.4)
Percentage of woodlots established 
since 1991 75.6 91.3 78.0
(8.8) (5.2) (7.6)
Percentage of woodlots promoted
by a program or organization 94.6 98.7 95.5
(3.8) (1.4) (3.0)
promoted by BoANRD 76.5 91.4 79.5
(8.7) (7.4) (7.2)
promoted by REST 4.6 0.0 3.7
(3.7) (0.0) (3.0)
promoted by BoANRD and REST 4.8 7.3 5.3
(4.6) (7.2) (3.9)
promoted by World Vision 4.8 0.0 3.8
(4.6) (0.0) (3.7)
Percentage of woodlots where users are:
All tabia members 0.0 94.8 19.6
(0.0) (5.3) (6.4)
Only village members 100.0 0.0 79.1
(0.0) (0.0) (6.4)
Only the guard 0.0 5.2 1.1
(0.0) (5.3) (1.1)
Note: a Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification
and weights.
about 8 ha. in size, although there is much variation in numbers and sizes
of woodlots across communities. Most of the woodlots have been estab-
lished since the fall of the former Derg government in 1991. The
establishment of most woodlots has been promoted by external organiz-
ations; usually the Tigray Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Natural
Resource Development (BoANRD). In a few cases, non-government organ-
izations, including the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) or World Vision,
were involved.
Most woodlots are managed at the village level by the village council,
and are used only by members of that village. However, about one-third of
the tabias that have woodlots manage them at the tabia level, in which case
the tabia council is responsible for management. In almost all cases, all
members of the tabia are allowed to use the tabia-managed woodlots,
though, in a few cases, only the guard is allowed to use the woodlot. Tabia-
managed woodlots tend to be larger than village-managed ones, averaging
more than 18 ha in size compared to about 5 ha for village woodlots.
The most common use allowed on woodlots is to cut and collect grass
for animal feed, roof materials, or other purposes (table 2). Collecting fruits
and beekeeping in woodlots are also commonly allowed. These uses 
are more common on village-managed than tabia-managed woodlots. 
Most other uses, including cutting trees, shrubs, branches, or roots, and
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Table 2. Allowed uses of community woodlots
Percentage of woodlots (standard errors in parentheses)a
Use Village- Tabia- All woodlots
managed managed
Grazing 0.6 8.9 2.3
(0.6) (5.7) (1.3)
Cut and remove grass 71.1 39.9 64.7
(9.5) (15.0) (8.3)
Collect fuelwood 4.4 0.0 3.5
(3.9) (0.0) (3.1)
Collect dung 1.0 0.0 0.8
(1.0) (0.0) (0.8)
Cut and remove trees or branches 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Cut and remove shrubs 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Collect leaves 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Collect bark 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Collect roots 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Collect fruits or seeds 60.0 49.1 57.8
(9.4) (15.4) (8.4)
Beekeeping 61.1 38.4 56.4
(9.6) (14.2) (8.4)
Note: a Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification
and weights.
collecting fuelwood, bark, leaves, or dung, are not allowed in woodlots. In
a few cases animals are allowed to graze in the woodlot, but only during a
drought.
Woodlots are protected in almost all cases by a guard paid in cash or in
kind. In some cases, the guard is compensated by being allowed to collect
grass from the woodlot. For village-managed woodlots, the village resi-
dents pay the guard in most cases; while for tabia-managed woodlots,
external organizations such as BoANRD and REST are more involved.
Thus, it is more common for the local community to hire the guard for
village-managed than for tabia-managed woodlots (table 3).
Violations of restrictions are usually punished by a cash fine set by the
community council, though in many cases fines are decided by the local
court. The most common violations of restrictions in 1998 were cutting
grass, grazing animals, and cutting trees or branches. Violations are more
common on tabia-managed woodlots. Fines were typically less than 100 EB
(about $14 in 1998) for cutting grass or grazing, but could be much higher
for cutting trees. In some cases a fine of as much as 500 EB and imprison-
ment were imposed for cutting trees.
Given the limited allowed uses of the woodlots, the benefits received
are, not surprisingly, small. Of 164 village-managed woodlots in our
sample, benefits were reported being received in 1998 from only 57 wood-
lots, mainly from cutting grass. Fewer than half of the households in the
villages benefited from grass cutting on average, and the average esti-
mated value of benefit was 2,783 EB per woodlot in 1998, only about 2 EB
per capita in the villages where benefits were received. The benefits from
tabia-managed woodlots are even lower, averaging only 352 EB per
woodlot, less than 0.10 EB per capita.
Both local and external organizations play important roles in managing
the woodlots. The most important local organization is the tabia or village
140 Berhanu Gebremedhin et al.
Table 3. Indicators of collective action to manage woodlots
Means (standard errors in parentheses)a
Indicator Village- Tabia- All woodlots
managed managed
Number of labor days per ha
invested in the woodlot in 1998 152.23 231.75 164.75
(35.86) (203.7) (65.90)
Percentage of woodlots protected
by a guard hired by the community 54.4 28.2 49.0
(10.9) (10.3) (9.2)
Percentage of woodlots where violations
of restrictions occurred in 1998 19.5 35.8 22.8
(5.8) (12.0) (5.4)
Density of trees planted per ha 5205 1814 4453
(2372) (511) (1837)
Percentage survival rate of trees 61.6 71.1 63.7
(5.8) (9.6) (5.1)
Note: a Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification
and weights.
council, depending on which level manages the woodlot. These organiz-
ations are involved in organizing and encouraging participation in
woodlot development, developing rules and regulations, and financing
the guard. The most important external organization is the BoANRD,
which is involved mainly in providing material support (including
seedlings) and technical assistance.
Villages are pursuing a more intensive strategy of woodlot management
than tabias. Labor for tree planting, constructing soil and water conservation
structures, weeding and harrowing are the main collective input, averaging
0.18 person-days per capita for village-managed woodlots and 0.13 person-
days per capita for tabia-managed woodlots. Village woodlots are also
planted much more densely than tabia woodlots. The average survival rate
is somewhat higher for tabia woodlots, but, considering the differences in
planting densities, the number of surviving trees per hectare is still much
higher on village woodlots. Considering the average returns per capita
reported above, the average return per person day invested in 1998 was
about 10 EB for village-managed woodlots (comparable to the daily wage
rate in rural Tigray), but less than 1 EB for tabia-managed woodlots.
Of course, the main benefit of a woodlot is not the value of grass collected,
but the value of the trees in the woodlot, a non-liquidated capital gain. The
most commonly planted trees in community woodlots are eucalyptus trees
(especially globulos and camaldulensis). The average price of eucalyptus
poles in the highlands of Tigray was about 28 EB per pole in 1998 (Jagger
and Pender, 2000). Considering the average planting density (about 4,500
trees per ha) and survival rate (64 per cent) reported in table 3, a woodlot of
average-sized eucalyptus trees would be worth more than 80,000 EB per ha.
on average, and much more in places where wood is very scarce. With an
average of more than 70 ha of woodlots per tabia (nine woodlots averaging
almost 8 ha each), this represents a substantial contribution to the wealth of
communities in Tigray (averaging more than 5 million EB per community).
Thus, despite the limited amount of current benefits that people are
receiving from community woodlots in Tigray, community members are
generally satisfied that they will benefit from them eventually. Only a
small fraction of communities report uncertainty about future benefits as a
problem, though the problem is more commonly reported for tabia-
managed than village-managed woodlots. The survey also inquired about
other possible problems caused by woodlots, including reduction in
grazing area, less wood available, pests, conflicts over use, and fire
hazards. Most of these problems were generally regarded as minor or non-
existent. In some communities, however, less grazing area, less availability
of wood, and pests were seen as major problems. In almost all cases, com-
munity members reported that the condition of the area where the
woodlot was established had improved substantially as a result of the pro-
tection and investment in developing the woodlot.
Scarcity of fuelwood is a critical problem in many communities, mainly
due to the deforestation that has occurred over many years. In the recent
past, however, this scarcity may have been aggravated by restrictions on
collecting fuelwood from woodlots. For example, 13 of the 100 sample
villages reported that fuelwood had declined in rank as a source of fuel for
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cooking since 1991 (none reported an increase in importance of fuelwood),
and in all of these cases shortage of fuelwood was cited as the reason for
the change. In 11 of these cases, the rank of dung as a fuel source had
increased and in several burning of crop residues had increased in import-
ance (the rank of these sources did not change in other villages). Thus,
even though restrictions on using woodlots are leading to improved con-
ditions of the woodlots, they may be contributing to declining soil fertility
in the near term as dung and crop residues are increasingly used for fuel,
rather than being recycled to the soil.
To summarize the descriptive analysis, we find that woodlots are con-
tributing substantially to the wealth of communities in Tigray, even
though the near term benefits are limited due to restrictions on use. We
find that village-managed woodlots are more common and smaller than
tabia-managed woodlots, provide more near-term benefits, community
members invest more effort in managing them, there are fewer violations
of restrictions in the village woodlots, they are planted much more
densely, and the number of surviving trees per hectare is also higher,
despite somewhat lower survival rates per tree planted in village wood-
lots. In the next section, we test whether there are statistically significant
differences in the management and survival of trees on village vs. tabia
woodlots, controlling for other factors, as well as the other hypotheses pre-
sented earlier about factors affecting woodlot management.
Econometric analysis
The econometric results are presented in table 4. We include dummy
variables for the different zones of Tigray to proxy for differences in agro-
climatic potential (the Southern and Western zones have generally higher
potential, due to better soils and irrigation in the Southern Zone and
higher rainfall in the Western Zone), as well as other differences between
these zones (e.g., differences in enforcement of restrictions on woodlots by
zonal and woreda authorities). We include population density and popu-
lation density squared to test for an inverted-U shaped relationship
between population density and collective action. Market access is rep-
resented by distance to the woreda (district) town, which is usually where
farmers market their produce and purchase inputs. The effect of external
organizational presence is investigated by including a dummy variable
indicating whether the woodlot was promoted by an external organiz-
ation. Another dummy variable reflects whether the woodlot is
village-managed or tabia-managed. Finally, the size of the woodlot 
is included to investigate whether there are economies (or diseconomies)
of scale in woodlot protection and management.
We find that the intensity of management of woodlots (labor input, com-
munity contribution to protection, and planting density) are lowest in the
Central zone of Tigray, while survival rate is the highest in this zone (con-
trolling for other differences between zones). This suggests that a
less-intensive approach to woodlots is being pursued in the Central zone,
but that this can be consistent with higher survival rates (though lower
density of surviving trees), probably because of less competition among
trees in the less-densely planted woodlots for water, sunlight and
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Table 4. Determinants of collective action and its effectiveness on community woodlots, 1998a
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Explanatory variable Collective labor input Whether community Whether any Number of trees Survival rate of
(person-days per ha) pays for guard violations of planted per ha planted trees (%)
restrictions occurred
Central zone (cf. Southern
zone) 1541.292 (2.439) 1.258 (1.673) 0.437 (0.043) 11374 (2.168) 18.03 (1.856)
Eastern zone (cf. Southern
zone) 928.882 (1.810) 1.060 (1.682) 1.509 (3.845) 2288 (0.283) 17.50 (1.917)
Western zone (cf. Southern
zone) 1442.685 (1.523) 0.363 (1.013) 1.029 (1.139) 6853 (0.171) 5.24 (1.302)
1994 population density
(per km.2) 36.545 (2.148) 0.0110 (0.026) 0.0122 (0.678) 249.3 (2.346) 0.0085 (0.798)
1994 pop. density squared 0.1023 (2.106) 0.0000601 (0.371) 0.0000387 (1.146) 0.693 (2.395) 0.000255 (0.961)
Distance to woreda town
(km.) 16.0929 (2.103) 0.00462 (1.563) 0.00623 (0.264) 241.5 (2.063) 0.350 (3.803)
Woodlot promoted by
external organization 1148.053 (1.543) 1.286 (3.011) 0.0870 (1.346) 5505 (1.231) 5.573 (4.635)
Woodlot managed by village
(cf. managed by tabia) 615.094 (1.066) 0.668 (0.678) 0.158 (0.769) 5114 (0.097) 7.712 (1.521)
Area of woodlot (ha) 28.1209 (1.175) 0.0122 (1.023) 0.00500 (1.034) 278.3 (1.514) 0.426 (0.039)
Intercept 3639.085 (2.151) 0.842 (1.132) 0.900 (1.167) 12067 (1.034) 38.95 (2.139)
Type of regression Tobit Probit Probit Least squares Tobit
R2 / pseudo R2 0.231b 0.273c 0.136c 0.525 0.436b
Number of positive
observations/total obs. 66/223 110/219 53/219 76/76 73/76d
Notes: a All regression results are corrected for sampling stratification and sampling weights, and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
b non-independence within the primary sampling units (tabias).
b R2 for least squares regression on the same data.
c Pseudo R2 values.
d Planting density and survival data were not collected for all woodlots in the sample.
nutrients. Community labor input is also lower in the Eastern zone than in
the Southern zone, but community contributions to protecting woodlots
are greater, leading to fewer violations of restrictions and higher survival
rates. Thus, the approach to community woodlots in the Eastern zone
appears to be oriented towards less labor intensity of management but
greater effort to protect the trees, with favorable impact on tree survival.
We find no statistically significant differences in tree management, protec-
tion or survival between the Western and Southern zones.
We find that the labor intensity of woodlot management is positively
associated with population density, but negatively associated with popu-
lation density squared, consistent with the hypothesis of an inverse
U-shaped relationship between population density and collective action.
The turning point in this relationship (where maximum predicted collec-
tive labor input occurs) is at 179 persons per square km., well within the
range of population density observed in Tigray (the range in our sample is
from 39 to 302 persons per square km.).7 The magnitude of the impact is
also substantial: an increase of population density from 40 to 50 persons
per square km. would increase predicted labor input per hectare 273 labor
days (much more than the average labor input per capita on woodlots
which is 164 labor days per ha).
Other indicators of collective action and its effectiveness—including
whether the community pays for a guard, violations of restrictions and
survival rate of trees—also show a relationship consistent with the
inverted-U hypothesis (with the signs of the coefficients reversed for vio-
lations of restrictions), though these relationships are statistically
insignificant. Unexpectedly, there is a statistically significant U-shaped
relationship between planting density and population density, with
planting density first falling and later rising as population density
increases (the turning point is at 180 persons per square km.). It may be
that lower planting density at moderate population density is a result of
collective action; i.e., a decision by communities to not overexploit the
woodlot area by restricting the planting density. If this is the case, then this
relationship also supports the hypothesis of an inverse-U relationship
between collective action and population density. However, this is only an
ex post hypothesis to explain a result that we did not expect, and further
research would be needed to confirm or reject this hypothesis.
With regard to market access, we find that communities that are more
remote provide greater collective labor input, plant trees more densely,
and obtain higher survival rates. These results are both statistically and
quantitatively significant: being 10 km. further from the woreda town
increases predicted labor input by 16 labor days per hectare (one-tenth of
average labor input), predicted planting density by 2400 trees per ha and
tree survival by 3.5 percentage points. These findings are consistent with
the argument that improved market access undermines collective action
by increasing labor opportunity costs and/or giving people more exit
options from the community.
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7 Summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions are presented in the
Appendix.
The presence of external organizations, as indicated by whether the
woodlot was promoted by an external organization (usually the
BoANRD), has a negative association with whether the community pays
for a guard and with tree survival. The negative association with com-
munity payment for a guard is probably due to the fact that external
organizations often pay for the guard, as discussed earlier, reducing the
need for this aspect of collective action. This is similar to results found by
Pender and Scherr (1999) in Honduras, where external government organ-
izations were found to displace local collective action. The negative
association of external promotion with tree survival suggests that external
programs may not be achieving full participation of local communities in
promoting woodlots. Part of the problem may be that local communities
often prefer to plant eucalyptus, which survive well and grow rapidly
under the uncertain-rainfall of Tigray, whereas external organizations
sometimes promote other species that may be less hearty or less preferred
by local households (Jagger and Pender, 2000).
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find that collective action was
significantly greater or more effective on village-managed woodlots than
on tabia-managed woodlots, after controlling for other factors. This may be
because the differences in benefits, community stability or cohesiveness
between the tabia level and the village level are relatively small; while
other factors such as population density, market access or external organ-
izations may be more responsible for the differences in collective action
found on different woodlots. The area of the woodlot also had a statisti-
cally insignificant impact on our measures of collective management of
woodlots and its effectiveness. This suggests that economies or disec-
onomies of scale in woodlot management are weak.
A possible alternative explanation for the weak influence of some vari-
ables is that there may be multicollinearity among the explanatory
variables. We tested for problems of multicollinearity, and found potential
problems only between the population density and density- squared vari-
ables. The correlation between these variables is almost 0.98, leading to
high variance inflation factors for these variables (Chatterjee and Price,
1991). However, both variables were included in the models since they
have statistically significant co-efficients. Moreover, omitting one of the
variables would result in omitted variable bias. None of the other explana-
tory variables has a variance inflation factor greater than 3, indicating that
multicollinearity is not a major concern for these variables (Ibid.).
6. Conclusion and implications
Collective action in managing woodlots generally functions well in Tigray,
which supports the role of community resource management in redressing
resource degradation. Despite the fact that the community benefits in 1998
were limited due to various restrictions on use of the woodlots, the wood-
lots contribute substantially to community wealth, and community
members are generally satisfied with the woodlots as a reserve of natural
capital.
Benefits were greater and reported problems of managing the woodlots
were less on woodlots managed at the village level than those managed at
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the higher tabia level. Communities that managed woodlots at the village
level applied greater labor inputs, planted trees much more densely, more
often hired a guard, and less often had violations of restrictions. Although
average tree survival (per tree planted) was lower on village-managed
woodlots, the number of trees surviving per ha. was greater in village
woodlots. Most of these differences were not found to be statistically sig-
nificant after controlling for other factors, suggesting that other factors
besides the level of management are more important in determining the
extent and effectiveness of collective management of community wood-
lots. However, village-level management of community woodlots has
superior economic significance.
We found some support for the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped
relationship between population density and collective action, especially
with respect to collective labor input. However, many of the findings with
respect to population density were statistically weak, and some suggest that
population pressure can undermine collective action (especially contribu-
tion to protection of woodlots) even at lower levels of population density.
We found that access to markets appears to undermine the intensity of
collective management of woodlots and its effectiveness in ensuring tree
survival, probably because this increases the opportunity costs of people’s
time and/or the ‘exit options’ of community members. Promotion of wood-
lots by external organizations appears to displace local collective action in
protecting the woodlot and contributes to lower tree survival rates.
Our findings imply that collective action can be an effective means of
redressing resource degradation and increasing community wealth.
However, they also suggest that the effectiveness of collective action may
be undermined by restrictions that limit the benefits of woodlots to local
communities, by promotional efforts that displace local initiative or
promote planting of trees that are less acceptable to local communities, or
by management at a higher administrative level. Community management
of woodlots, and perhaps other natural resources, is likely to be more effec-
tive if conducted at the lowest level consistent with concerns about
distributional issues and externalities, and if external interventions
respond to local concerns and priorities rather than being imposed.
Our findings suggest that collective woodlot management is likely to be
more intensive and effective in communities that are more remote from
markets or that have low to moderate population density. In such com-
munities, which are often in lower potential areas where agricultural
development is difficult to achieve, development and management of com-
munity woodlots may be a key element of an effective development strategy.
In areas of greater market access or high population density, private-
oriented approaches to resource management may be more effective.
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Appendix. Summary statistics of variables used in regressions
Variable No. of Meana Standard Minimum Maximum
observations Errora
Labor days per hectare 223 164.76 65.90 0 10,800
Whether community
hires a guard 223 0.490 0.092 0 1
Whether violations of
restrictions occurred 223 0.228 0.054 0 1
Number of trees planted
per ha 80 4,453 1,837 333 51,750
Tree survival rate (%) 80 63.7 5.1 0 97.5
Southern zone 233 0.141 0.049 0 1
Central zone 233 0.423 0.100 0 1
Eastern zone 233 0.397 0.100 0 1
Western zone 233 0.039 0.019 0 1
1994 population
(density (per km.2) 225 154.9 14.7 39.5 301.7
Distance to woreda
town (km.) 229 27.6 5.0 0.87
Woodlot promoted by
external organization 227 0.949 0.233 0 1
Woodlot managed by
village (cf. managed
by tabia) 227 0.799 0.063 0 1
Area of woodlot (ha) 227 7.76 1.34 0.13 100
Note: a Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification
and weights.
